Generalized Signcryption is a fresh cryptographic primitive that not only can obtain encryption and signature in a single operation, but also provives encryption or signature alone when needed. This paper gives a formal definition of certificateless generalized signcryption and its security model is present. A concrete certificateless generalized signcryption scheme is also proposed in this paper.
Introduction
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive proposed by Zheng in 1997 that could obtain encryption and signature in a single operation, which is more efficient than the traditional signature-then-encryption [1] . Since then, many schemes of signcryption are proposed. Malone-Lee gave the first identity based signcryption scheme in 2002 [2] , following which several other identity based signcryption were proposed. Since the key escrow property of identity based cryptosystems is inherent, to avoid this problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new cryptographic primitive as certificateless public key system [3] . The users' private key is computed by a KGC and the users themselves, which eliminates the key escrow problem in identity based system and cumbersome certificate management problem in traditional public key system. Many certificateless signature and encryption schemes are provided. The first certificateless signcryption was given by M.Barbosa and P.Farshim in 2003 [4] , several other certificateless signcryption were proposed since then [5] [6] .
The notion of generalized signcryption was termed by Han Yiliang and
Yang Xiaoyuan in 2006 [7] . The idea is that using a special "signcryption", one not only can simultaneously get confidentiality and authentication, but also obtain confidentiality or authentication alone. This special "signcryption" is called generalized signcryption. Wang Xu-an el al gave the first security model for generalized signcryption and an improved generalized signcryption [8] . The first ID-based vision is proposed by S. Lal and P. Kushwah [9] .
In this paper, we propose a certificateless generalized signcryption(CLGSC). First we define the formal definition of CLGSC; second, we give the security notions for this new primitive; third, a new CLGSC scheme is proposed.
The paper is organized as following: in the next section, we give the formal model and the security model of CLGSC. The definition of bilinear pairings and related computational hard problem are given in section 3. In section 4 we give the concrete CLGSC. The correctness and efficiency is analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Formal Model of CLGSC

Certificateless Generalized Signcryption
A certificateless generalized signcryption scheme is defined by the following five probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
1 Setup (1 k ): Given a security parameter k, PKG executes this algorithm and generates a master key S and global parameters params. PKG publishes params and keep S secret.
2 Extract-Partial-Private-Key(ID, S, params). Given a user identity ID, PKG runs the algorithm and returns a partial private key D.
3 Set-User-Key (ID, D, params). Given a user ID, partial private key D and params, user runs the algorithm and returns a public key of the identity PK, and a secret key x, the private key of the user is (x, D). 4 GSC. This algorithm has 3 scenarios: signcryption, signature and encryption. 4.2 Signature: if user A wants to sign a message m without definite receiver, the input is (S A , m, ID φ ), where ID φ means the receiver is null, the output
Signcryption: if user
4.3 Encryption: if someone wants to send message m to B confidentially, the input is (S φ , m, ID B ), where S φ denotes the private key corresponding to ID φ .
The output is (,,) B GSCSmID ϕ σ = .
5 UGSC. Given σ, if it is valid, the receiver B unsigncrypts the ciphertext and returns m and (or) the signature on m by A, otherwise return ⊥means fail.
Security model for CLGSC
Now we describe the security model for certificateless generalized signcryption under the inside attacker. In confidentiality and unforgeability game we provide access to the following oracles:
1. Extract Partial private key: given an identity ID, the oracle returns the partial private key D using the Extract-Partial-private-key algorithm.
2. Extract Secret Key: given an identity ID, the oracle returns the full secret key SK=(x, D) of ID using the Set-user-key algorithm. 3. Request public key: given an identity ID, the oracle returns the public key PK of ID using the Set-user-key algorithm. 4. Replace public key: given an identity ID and a valid public key PK ', this oracle replace the public key of ID with PK'. If the identity's public key doesn't exist, then it is obtained through the Set-user-key algorithm and then replaced by PK'. A isn't empty, and its' private key doesn't exist, first running the Set-userkey algorithm to get A's full secret key and then running algorithm GSC. 6. UGSC oracle: given a ciphertext, sender identity A, a receiver identity B, the oracle returns the result of running UGSC algorithm. As in many certificateless cryptosystems, we consider two types adversary, Type-I and Type-II adversary in the security definition of CLGSC. Roughly, the Type-I adversary models a common user without the master secret key, while the Type-II adversary models the honest but curious KGC.
Type-I adversary: since a Type-I adversary is a common user, he is allowed to request the above 6 oracles with the following constraint:
1. Adversary is not allowed to request the master secret key; 2. No extract secret key query is allowed on the challenge identities. 3. Adversary is not allowed to request the extract partial private key of the challenge identities.
Type-II adversary: a Type-II adversary is an honest but curious KGC, so he is given the master secret key, he is allowed to request the above 6 oracles with the following constraint:
1. No extract secret key query is allowed on the challenge identities. 2. No replace public key query is allowed on the challenge identities before the challenge phase. 
Confidentiality
Preliminaries
We briefly review the basic definition of bilinear pairings and some related complexity assumptions.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p and P be a random 2) e is non-degenerate, i.e. e(P, P) ≠ 1 2 G ; 3) e is efficiently computable.
Complexity Assumptions
In this subsection, we show several computational assumptions related to bilinear pairing that are relevant to the security of our scheme. We say that k-CAA is (t, ϵ) hard if for any t time probabilistic algorithm A, the advatange Adv A k-CAA < ϵ.
